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HOW DO BANK REGULATORS DETERMINE
CAPITAL ADEQUACY REQUIREMENTS?
Eric A. Posner ∗
Abstract. Minimum capital regulations play a central role in
banking regulation. Regulators require banks to maintain
capital above a certain level in order to correct incentives to
make excessively risky loans and investments. However, it has
never been clear how regulators determine how high or low the
minimum capital-asset ratio should be. An examination of U.S.
regulators’ justifications for five regulations issued over more
than 30 years reveals that regulators have never performed (or
at least disclosed) a serious economic analysis that would justify
the levels that they chose. Instead, regulators appear to have
followed a practice of what I call “norming”—incremental
change designed to weed out a handful of outlier banks. This
approach resulted in a significant regulatory failure because it
could not have given, and did not give, banks an adequate
incentive to increase capital. The failure of banking regulators
to use cost-benefit analysis in order to determine capital
requirements may therefore have contributed to the financial
crisis of 2007-2008.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the central concepts in banking regulation is capital
adequacy. Capital adequacy refers to the extent to which the assets of
a bank exceed its liabilities, and is thus a measure of the ability of the
bank to withstand a financial loss. Bank regulators care about capital
adequacy because their mandate is to prevent bank panics and
contagions. A bank with a high ratio of capital to assets will, all else
equal, be better able to withstand a sudden loss than a bank with a
low capital-asset ratio. As a result, such a bank is less likely to be
thrown into insolvency or subject to a run.
Financial regulators have always focused on capital adequacy,
but regulations have evolved considerably over the years. From
World War II until the early 1980s, regulators treated capital
adequacy as just one factor in their evaluations of the overall health
of a bank. They did not formulate specific capital adequacy rules—
such as minimum ratios—and different regulators used different
definitions of capital adequacy. In response to problems in the
banking system in the 1970s, regulators began to think about capital
adequacy more carefully. This led to four related developments. First,
regulators developed specific capital-adequacy rules to replace the
vague standards under which capital adequacy was treated as just
one factor among many. Second, regulators developed more specific
definitions of capital adequacy. Third, over time regulators adopted
increasingly strict minimum capital-asset ratios. Fourth, the different
bank regulators began to coordinate their approaches to regulating
capital.
These developments were related. Rules were used to spur
banks to raise capital, but the process of drafting rules required
regulators to think carefully about how to treat different types of
assets and liabilities for the purpose of determining capital-asset
requirements. And as regulators moved from vague standards to
bright-line rules, inconsistencies between their approaches became
too obvious to ignore. Because banks can, within limits, move from
one regulator to another by rechartering, regulators face pressure to
act consistently. 1
See Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Competition in the US Federal System:
Banking and Financial Services, in Regulatory Competition and Economic
Integration: Comparative Perspectives, at 95 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin
eds., 2001) (describing banks’ options among different regulators).
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A further consequence of the move to rule-based regulation is
that it became necessary for regulators to provide public
justifications for the rules that they adopted. As we will see, most of
these justifications were terse, opaque, and laden with boilerplate. As
a result, the reasoning behind those rules was unclear. The only clear
idea that emerges from an examination of the regulatory documents
is that the regulators believed that the regulations would affect very
few banks, on the order of 5 percent or fewer. Thus, a major theme
that emerges is that regulators defended their regulations in part on
the grounds that those regulations did not inflict costs on most
banks.
While most regulatory agencies in the executive branch are
required to issue cost-benefit analyses along with regulations, the
bank regulators rarely did so, and the cost-benefit analyses that they
did issue were badly executed. 2 Only in 2011 was a high-quality costbenefit analysis prepared—by an international organization, not by
U.S. regulators—and it showed that capital requirements should have
been much higher than they ever were. Most economists appear to
share this view, and many commentators have blamed the financial
crisis of 2007-2008 on inadequate capitalization of banks.
Accordingly, the history of capital adequacy regulation raises an
interesting possibility—that if bank regulators had used cost-benefit
analysis from the start, the 2007-2008 financial crisis would have
not taken place or (more likely) been less severe.
If bank regulators did not engage in cost-benefit analysis,
what decision-procedure did they use to formulate capital adequacy
requirements? I will argue that the best theory for the regulators
choices’ is what I will call “norming.” Norming, as I use the term,
means choosing a regulatory standard that permits the mean or
modal behavior of regulated entities, and only rules out outliers at
the low end. As a consequence, norming imposes zero costs on most
banks and requires a change of behavior only in the weakest banks,
which must either raise capital or go out of business.
After describing the process of norming in bank regulation, I
discuss why it might have been an attractive approach for bank
regulators. Norming is a restrained style of regulation that causes no
harm to most regulated entities and thus minimizes political
2

See discussion in Part II, infra.
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opposition to the regulation. Indeed, norming may benefit most
regulated entities by eliminating competitors. For just this reason,
norming is a highly questionable approach to regulation since
regulation is supposed to counter externalities and the average
regulated entity imposes externalities.
If this is true, then the case for cost-benefit analysis of
financial regulations is stronger than its critics acknowledge. 3 This
argument also should help put to rest the claim that cost-benefit
analysis is inherently deregulatory, a claim that has frequently been
made by critics of cost-benefit analysis, who blame it for
undermining environmental, health, and safety regulation. 4
The plan is as follows. In part I, I provide some background on
capital adequacy regulations. They are designed to counter a market
failure that is associated with financial intermediation, the major
economic function of banks. In part II, I describe the history of those
regulations, including the justifications that regulators provided and
the effects of those regulations on the behavior of banks. I focus on
the major changes to those regulations, which took place in 1981,
1985, 1989, 2007, and 2013. An important theme of this discussion is
that regulators believed that the capital regulations before 2013
would not affect most banks, and the evidence suggests that their
belief was correct. Although capital-asset ratios gradually rose over
the decades, the evidence suggests that they rose in response to
market forces rather than to the regulations. 5 In part III, I discuss
more broadly the advantages and disadvantages of norming as a
See John C. Coates, IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case
Studies and Implications, Yale L.J. (forthcoming) (criticizing cost-benefit analysis
of financial regulations); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Cost-Benefit
Analysis, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming) (same). For defenses of cost-benefit analysis
of financial regulation, see Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Analysis for
Financial Regulation, 103 Amer. Econ. Rev. Pap. & Proc. 393 (2013) (defending
cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl,
Benefit-Cost Paradigms in Financial Regulation, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming, 2014)
(same); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial
Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, Yale L.J. F. (forthcoming, 2014)
(responding to Coates and Gordon).
4 See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of
Everything and the Value Of Nothing (2005); Thomas McGarrity, Freedom to
Harm: The Lasting Legacy of the Laissez Faire Revival (2013).
5 See, e.g., Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, & Robert Marquez, Credit Market
Competition and Capital Regulation, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 873 (2011) (explaining that
banks may raise capital in order to reduce the cost of debt when creditors worry
that the banks are too risky).
3
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strategy for regulating the financial industry. Norming can in theory
be given a policy justification, but a better explanation is that it is an
excuse for regulatory failure in the face of entrenched industry
opposition.
I. CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATIONS: THEIR PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE
The theory of bank regulation is based on the risks that banks
pose to the economy. Banks are financial intermediaries
characterized by a liquidity mismatch between the asset and liability
side of the balance sheet. On the asset side, banks usually hold a
large number of long-term, customized loans. If the bank must
quickly raise capital, it can sell these loans, but because the loans are
illiquid, the bank will have to sell them at a deep discount from their
face value. 6 Consider a $100,000 five-year loan to an automaker, or a
$200,000 30-year mortgage to a homeowner. These loans are
unique products. The market value of the loans—the price that a
third party will pay for them—is a function of many variables,
including the probability that the loan will be paid in full, and the
value of underlying assets in case it is not. The probability that the
automaker will pay its loan depends on all kinds of factors—how
good management is, for example. The probability that the mortgage
will be paid depends on the income, honesty, and competence of the
borrower, plus the value of the house at the time of default if default
strikes. The bank possesses inside information about these factors
that is not accessible to potential buyers. The buyers will need to
satisfy themselves by investigating the loans, but that takes time, so if
the bank needs to sell the loan quickly, it can do so only at a discount.
On the liability side, banks typically hold a large amount of
highly liquid debt—above all, demand deposits (checking accounts).
Customers lend money to the bank by depositing cash or checks or
other financial instruments with it, and have the right to withdraw
any or all of their money at any time without notice. Normally,
customers withdraw money at about the same rate that they deposit
it, so the pool of liquid liability remains constant. That means the
bank can safely lend it out in the form of illiquid loans. But from time
to time, customers may withdraw their money en masse. They may
do so because of a severe economic downturn, rumors about the
See Rustom Irani et al., Loan Sales and Bank Liquidity Risk Management:
Evidence from the Shared National Credit Program 38 (unpub. m.s. 2014).
6
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bank’s solvency, or other random factors. This is called a run. If a run
starts, the bank has few choices. It can sell off assets at a discount,
but risk insolvency. It may be able to borrow from another bank long
enough to reassure customers. But there is a good chance that the
bank will fail.
A bank failure by itself is not necessarily a problem that calls
for government intervention. In principle, depositors and other
creditors will be compensated for the risk of bank failure in the form
of interest and other consideration. 7 Bank failure is a problem for the
government because of the risk of contagion. 8 Banks lend money to
each other, so if one bank fails, other banks may fail as well. If many
banks fail, then businesses that depend on credit (as most do) will
have trouble obtaining credit, and many of those businesses will fail,
throwing employees out of work. While in principle investors could
create new banks to replace the old ones, or surviving banks could
expand their lending in order to compensate for bank failures, the
collapse of existing banks results in destruction of non-recoverable
value because information about borrowers is lost, and relationships
are destroyed. 9 Consumers will also not be able to borrow in order to
finance the purchase of houses, cars, and other items, and this will
further exacerbate the economic downturn. Moreover, banks play a
vital role in the payments system, so that widespread bank collapse
would interfere with the transmission of money from one person to
another. Financial crises in this way can cause general economic
collapse.
Bank failures occur in many ways, and not just through the
classic run by depositors. During the financial crisis of 2007-2008,
the major type of asset that caused problems was not the customized
loan but collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). While CDOs were
designed to be tradable and hence liquid, problems arose because of
their immense complexity. Their value was tied to thousands of
underlying mortgages. When housing prices started to decline,
investors discovered that their assumptions about the value of the
underlying mortgages, and hence about the value of CDOs, were
incorrect, and so they could no longer determine the value of the
7 This statement does not apply to depositors who receive insurance, an issue to
which I will return shortly.
8 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 401, 415 (1983).
9 See Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the
Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 Amer. Econ. Rev. 257 (1983).
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CDOs. Banks could thus not sell their CDOs in order to raise cash
except at huge discounts. Meanwhile, many large banks obtained
financing through the repo market, where they offered CDOs and
other securities as collateral for short-term (one- or two-day) loans
from pension funds and other large institutions. The lenders stopped
accepting CDOs as collateral (or required increasingly large
haircuts), and thus the banks could no longer borrow in short-term
markets. If forced to sell off CDOs at prevailing panic-driven prices,
they would have been driven into insolvency (as some were). 10
To prevent or mitigate financial panics, the government offers
two types of insurance. First, FDIC insurance protects depositors up
to $250,000. 11 Second, the Fed stands as lender of last resort, and
provides loans to any bank (and other types of financial institution)
that suffers a run during a financial crisis. 12 Although only FDIC
insurance is given the formal name of “insurance,” lender-of-last
resort lending is functionally insurance as well. Insurance should
discourage depositors from withdrawing money, or other creditors
from failing to roll over short-term loans, based on a false rumor or
worry about the economy, but it also suppresses creditors’ incentives
to monitor banks and ensure that they are safe before lending to
them. Thus, insurance of both types give banks an incentive (known
as “moral hazard”) to make risky loans and other investments. They
enjoy all the upside, while the downside is absorbed at least partly by
the government insurance system. 13
Even if deposit insurance and emergency lending did not
create perverse incentives, banks would still have incentives to take
excessive risk by maintaining too little capital given their portfolio of
assets relative to the social optimum. The reason is that a bank and
its creditors (to the extent they are able to engage in adequate
monitoring of bank risk-taking) do not take into account the costs of
bank failure to other banks in the financial system. If one bank fails,
then creditors of another bank may run because they believe that the
second bank has made loans to the first bank and will not be able to
See, e.g., Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand __ (). Note that many of
the institutions caught in this squeeze were investment banks rather than
commercial banks.
11 Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E).
12 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 347a.
13 The vast literature on the lender-of-last-resort function of central banks is too
large to cite; see, e.g., Financial Crises, Contagion, and the Lender of Last Resort: A
Reader (Charles Goodhart & Gerhard Illing eds. 2002).
10
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recover them; or fear that whatever caused the first bank to fail (such
as adverse economic conditions) will also cause the second bank to
fail. 14 If panic spreads and contagion results, a general financial crisis
will occur that will harm not only bank shareholders and creditors
but people who would benefit from borrowing but no longer can as a
result of the loss of liquidity throughout the system.
Bank regulation tries to counter these incentives. Its overall
purpose is to ensure that banks operate in a “safe and sound” way.
This means that the banks are not permitted to take excessive risks.
Regulation takes many forms. The FDIC charges a higher premium
to risky banks. 15 The bank regulators also limit the lines of business
that banks may enter, the size of loans, and so on. 16 But the focus of
all these efforts is the capital-asset ratio. Generally speaking, banks
with higher capital-asset ratios are given more freedom to manage
their portfolios than other banks. Banks with low capital-asset ratios
may be shut down.
To understand the significance of the capital-asset ratio,
consider the hypothetical bank balance sheet in Figure 1.
Figure 1: A Hypothetical Bank Balance Sheet
Assets
$100 in loans

Liabilities
$95 in demand deposits
$5 in common equity

This bank is solvent because its assets are worth more than its
liabilities. The capital-asset ratio is 5% ($5 / $100), which tells the
regulator that if the value of the assets decline by more than 5%, the
bank will become insolvent. Thus, the capital-asset ratio is a measure
of how robust a bank is against market shocks. Suppose, for example,
that interest rates rise, with the result that the value of the bank’s
14 See Phillippe Aghion et al., Contagious Bank Failures in a Free Banking System,
44 Eur. Econ. Rev. 718 (1999).
15 See Assessment Pricing Methods, 12 C.F.R. §§ 327.4, 327.9. Most academics
believe that the FDIC does not price risk accurately. See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya et
al., Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums, unpub. m.s. 2009, at 4-6,
available
at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/fdic_epr.pdf
(describing ways that FDIC insurance falls short of providing banks with optimal
incentives).
16 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 32.1.
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loan portfolio falls to $98. Now the bank has equity of $3, and its
capital-asset ratio is approximately 3% ($3 / $98). The regulator
would likely demand that the bank raise capital by issuing new
shares to investors. If investors pay $4 for new shares, the bank now
has assets of $102 ($98 plus $4 in cash from the investors), equity of
$7 ($102-$95), and a healthy capital-asset ratio of almost 7%.
The major effect of a high level of capital relative to assets is to
reduce the incentive to take risks. 17 If a bank has very low equity, its
shareholders have little to lose by taking risks. If the risk turns out
well, the shareholders make a profit; if it does not, the bank’s
creditors (and the government) absorbs the loss. By requiring banks
to hold more capital, the government puts more of the risk on the
shareholders. If investments go sour, the shareholders lose more
money. 18
How high capital ratios should be is a complex question. Some
scholars believe that they should be very high, as high as 50
percent. 19 Their reasons are derived from the Modigliani-Miller
theorem, which provides that the value of a firm is independent of its
mix of debt and equity. 20 If this theorem is correct, then there is no
economic cost from forcing banks to hold equity. Banks hold much
more debt than ordinary firms, and the likely explanation is that the
debt is implicitly subsidized by the government. However, the
Modigliani-Miller theorem is an abstraction—a useful starting point
for thinking about capital structure, not a description of the world.
Among other things, it assumes (counterfactually) the absence of
taxes, zero costs from bankruptcy, and an efficient capital market. In
17 Higher capital holdings also increase bank performance during a financial crisis
and decrease the possibility of bank failure. See Allen N. Berger & Christa H.S.
Bouwman, How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises?,
109 J. Fin. Econ. 146, 149-150 (2013).
18 See, e.g., Anat R. Admati & Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s
Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It 108 (2013), for a lucid exposition;
and Anat R. Admati, et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion
of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive, Rock Center for
Corporate Governance, Working Paper Series No. 161 (2013), for a shorter and
updated version.
19 See Interview with Eugene Fama, http://www.newyorker.com/news/johncassidy/interview-with-eugene-fama (last visited Aug. 24, 2014); John H.
Cochrane, The More Bank Capital, the Safer the Bank, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230491110457644448244
0753132, (last visited Aug 24, 2014); Admati & Hellwig, supra note __.
20 Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 268 (1958).
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the real world, there may well be costs from raising equity rather
than debt. 21 In addition, people obviously value demand deposits; if
banks were required to hold a huge amount of equity, then checking
accounts would become scarcer and more expensive. 22 The
magnitude of these costs is an empirical question.
Nonetheless, many economists have converged on the view
that high capital-asset ratios would be socially beneficial. 23 But this
raises an additional set of issues regarding how exactly the ratio
should be defined. First, not all assets are the same. Some loans are
riskier than others. When market conditions decline, risky loans may
default while safe loans do not. Regulators want to distinguish banks
with risky loans and banks with safe loans because banks with risky
loans are more likely to collapse in response to adverse market
conditions even if both types of banks have the same capital-asset
ratio. Another way to see this is that banks could undermine the
effect of a higher capital requirement by selling low-risk assets and
replacing them with high-risk assets. 24 To prevent banks from doing
this, one must adjust the ratio for the quality of the assets. Regulators
use a system of risk-weighting, to be discussed below. 25
A standard view is that debt may have value for corporate governance purposes.
See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305.
Another view is that issuing equity can be a negative signal of a firm’s financial
health. See Myers & Majluf, Corporate Finance and Investment Decisions When
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. Fin. Econ. 187, 208
(1984).
22 See Harry DeAngelo & René Stulz, Liquid-Claim Production, Risk Management,
and Bank Capital Structure: Why High Leverage is Optimal for Banks, ECGI –
Finance Working Paper No. 356 at 36 (May 14, 2014). For discussion and criticism
of DeAngelo & Stulz, see Admati et al., supra note __, at 37-40.
23 See Admati & Hellwig, supra note __; Mathias Dewatripont, et al., Rebalancing
the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis 96 (2010); Darrell Duffie, How
Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It 55 (2010); Heidi M. Schooner and Michael
W. Taylor, Global Bank Regulation: Principles and Policies (2009); Gary B. Gorton,
Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming (2012);
Roger B. Myerson, Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: A Review of
Admati and Hellwig’s The Bankers’ New Clothes, 52 J. Econ. Lit. 197, 209 (2014).
But see James R. Barth et al., Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for
Us 193 (2012) (“a system based on imposing required capital ratios … not only
encourages shadow banking, but raising those capital requirements, as discussed
below, increases the incentives for banks to move risky assets into off-balance
sheet entities.”).
24 See Daesik Kim & Anthony M. Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital
Regulation, 43 J. Fin. 1219, 1231 (1988).
25 See infra note __.
21
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Second, not all debt is the same. Demand deposits pose a
threat to banks because depositors can withdraw their money quickly
and without notice, depleting the vault cash of the bank and possibly
forcing it to sell illiquid assets at fire-sale prices or to pay a high rate
of interest for an emergency loan from another bank or from the Fed.
Long-term debt is less risky for a bank because the bank can
gradually sell assets to meet obligations as they become due. Other
forms of debt and quasi-debt, like preferred equity, also are less risky
because they become due only if there is ample resources to pay
short-term debt. Because the simple capital-asset ratio does not
distinguish between different types of debt and equity, it can give a
misleading impression of the vulnerability of banks with different
capital structures. Regulators address this problem by allowing
banks to treat the safest forms of debt as equity for purposes of
calculating the capital-asset ratio under some circumstances. 26
Third, the simple capital-asset ratio disregards off-balance
sheet obligations like loan commitments and standby letters of
credit. Suppose the bank in Figure 1 enters into a contract with a
customer to issue a $20 loan to it in one year. That loan will not
appear on the balance sheet until it is issued. When it does, the
bank’s capital-asset ratio may fall, depending on how the bank raises
capital to make that loan. A bank with many loan commitments is
thus riskier than a bank without them, yet this difference will not
appear in their capital-asset ratios. Regulators have addressed this
problem by requiring banks to translate off-balance sheet
commitments into appropriately weighted liabilities for purposes of
calculating the capital-asset ratio. 27
In sum, financial intermediation causes negative externalities
in the form of systemic risk. Government insurance helps mitigate
the risk of a financial panic but also creates moral hazard. Capital
regulation counters both this moral hazard and the excessive level of
risk-taking that is inherent in financial intermediation. But while
there is little debate that capital requirements are the appropriate
regulatory response as a matter of theory, economists have debated
the level and the form of optimal capital requirements.

26
27

See infra note __.
See infra note __.
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II. THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY
REGULATION BY U.S. REGULATORS
In this part, I provide a brief and necessarily incomplete
history of capital-adequacy regulation. 28 To keep this paper within
manageable bounds, I disregard state regulation of banks, federal
regulation of financial institutions other than commercial banks, and
regulation of bank-like institutions like thrifts. Thus, I focus on
federal regulation of commercial banks, and hence emphasize the
activities of the major federal bank regulators—the Federal Reserve
(the Fed), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). While the
jurisdictions of these agencies overlap a great deal, generally
speaking the OCC regulates nationally chartered banks, the Fed
regulates bank holding companies and state banks that belong to the
Federal Reserve System, and the FDIC regulates other state banks
that are members of the FDIC.
A. From World War II to the 1970s
This period is a prehistory of capital-adequacy regulation. The
financial regulators did not require banks to satisfy any specific
minimum capital rule. Instead, regulators applied a general “safety
and soundness” standard to all banks. Capital adequacy was only one
of many indicators that regulators looked at in order to determine
whether a bank was healthy. 29 Regulators would consider the
riskiness of assets, the quality of management, earnings, the size of
the bank, among other things, and then make an all-thingsconsidered-judgment as to whether a bank was in regulatory
compliance.
Because capital adequacy was just one factor among others
used to generate an overall assessment of a bank’s financial healthy,
regulators were not always specific about how they defined the
relevant components of the capital adequacy ratio—assets, liabilities,
and so on—and they did not try very hard to coordinate with each

28 For a brief, useful overview up to 1988, see Malcolm C. Alfriend, International
Risk-Based Capital Standard: History and Explanation, 74 Fed. Res. Bank of
Richmond Econ. Rev. 28 (Nov./Dec. 1988).
29 Alfriend, supra note __, at 29; Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future
of International Financial Regulation 29-35 (2008).
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other. Each regulator applied a different standard to the banks under
its jurisdiction. 30
The period from World War II to the late 1960s one was of
unusual stability in the banking system. While regulatory supervision
no doubt played a role, the usual explanation is that the United
States experienced low inflation and steady economic growth. 31
Banks were also barred from risky financial activities and protected
from competition by heavy restrictions on branching, significant
chartering requirements, and rules that barred them from charging a
market rate of interest on deposits. 32 Thus, managers may have
exercised caution because banks earned monopoly rents that they
would lose if their bank failed.
B. The Modern Regulatory Era
In the 1970s, the sleepy era of banking came to an end. High
inflation and low economic growth squeezed banks. Because of high
inflation, depositors demanded interest on deposits, but banks were
limited in what they could offer. Because of low economic growth,
demand for credit fell. Meanwhile, deregulation in the banking
industry reduced the monopoly rents enjoyed by owners of a bank
charter. Notably, money market mutual funds were allowed to offer
interest in return for short-term deposits with checking privileges,
and they attracted billions of dollars of deposits from banks. 33 A
number of banks failed during this period, and the capital-asset ratio
of most banks declined. Alarmed by this turn of events, the three
regulators agreed to try to coordinate on regulation, and to reverse
the decline of capital in the banking system. In 1981, they issued a
(partially) coordinated rule governing capital adequacy. 34
One major feature of this rule was the division of capital into
“primary” and “secondary” versions. Primary capital included
common stock, certain reserves, and preferred stock with sufficiently
Tarullo, supra note __, at 29-35.
See Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, Fragile by Design: The Political
Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit __ (2014).
32 See generally Banking Act of 1933 (“Glass-Steagall Act”), Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat.
162 (June 16 1933).
33 Calomiris & Huber, Fragile by Design __, supra note __.
34 Statement of Policy on Capital Adequacy, 46 Fed. Reg. 62693-02 (FDIC Dec. 28,
1981); Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 33 (Fed and OCC Jan. 1,
1982).
30
31
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long maturity. Secondary capital included other forms of preferred
stock and subordinated debt. “Total capital” equals primary capital
plus secondary capital. The regulators also agreed to create separate
rules for regional banks (assets between $1 billion and $15 billion)—
which were large and diversified—and community banks (assets
below $1 billion). 35 Table 1 provides a summary. 36
Table 1: 1981 Minimum Capital Regulations
Primary capital ratio
Total capital ratio

Regional Banks
5%
6.5%

Community Banks
6%
7%

Because regional banks were more diversified than community
banks, they were permitted a lower level of capital. Banks that fell
below these floors were not shut down immediately but subjected to
increasingly greater obligations to manage risk and raise capital as
their capital-asset ratios fell. 37
In 1983, Congress passed The International Lending
Supervision Act. 38 This statute directed the banking regulators to
“achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum
levels of capital for” the banks that they regulate. 39 The ILSA was
enacted in response to the Latin American debt crisis, which revealed
that some U.S. banks were dangerously exposed to risky foreign
sovereign debt. The law also put on firmer footing the regulators’
authority to issue capital adequacy rules. 40 The regulators used this
opportunity to simplify capital requirements. The distinction

Large multinational banks, with assets greater than $15 billion, were subjected to
a 5% floor in 1983. See FRB Minimum Capital Guidelines: Amendments, 69 Fed.
Res. Bull. 539 (July 1, 1983).
36 Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. at 34.
37 The FDIC used a slightly different system. It tried to take account of the riskiness
of assets and the different types of equity, but otherwise the approach and numbers
were similar. See FDIC Statement of Policy on Capital Adequacy, 46 Fed. Reg. at
62694, supra note __ (“When the adjusted equity capital ratio falls below this
level, the Corporation will insist on a specific program for remedying the equity
capital deficiency promptly.”).
38 Pub. L. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1278 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3901-12).
39 Id. at 1280 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907).
40 An OCC order requiring a bank to raise capital was vacated by a court in First
National Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674 (5th Cir.
1983).
35
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between community and regional banks was discarded. Table 2
summarizes the new system.
Table 2: 1985 Minimum Capital Regulations
Primary capital ratio
Total capital ratio

5.5%
6%

The regulators increased the primary capital ratio for regional banks
from 5% to 5.5%, and reduced it from 6% to 5.5% for community
banks. The regulators reduced the total capital ratio for regional
banks from 6.5% to 6%, and for community banks from 7% to 6%.
The next major round of changes took place starting in 1989.
The stimulus this time was the globalization of the financial system,
which led to regulatory arbitrage—and a potential race-to-thebottom—as large banks located offices and assets in countries with
the weakest regulatory systems. The central banks of the G-10
countries sent representatives to Basel, Switzerland, to hash out
regulatory standards acceptable to all. The result was the 1988 Basel
Accord (“Basel I”), which regulators agreed to apply to domestic
banking systems. 41
In the United States, banking regulators implemented the new
capital rules over several years (although for simplicity I will call
them the 1989 regulations).42 The 1989 regulations now
distinguished Tier 1 (instead of primary) and Tier 2 (instead of
secondary) capital. While the definitions differed slightly, the details
do not concern us. 43 The regulations also created a risk-weighting

41 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement
and
Capital
Standards
(July
1988),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf (last visited Aug 24, 2014). . The focus of
this paper is U.S. regulation, and so I will discuss the Basel accords only insofar as
they intersect with my topic. There is a large literature on the Basel agreements;
see, e.g., Charles Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A
History of the Early Years, 1974-1997 (2011); Tarullo, supra note __.
42 Capital; Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4186-01 (Jan. 27 1989);
Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4168-01 (Jan. 27 1989); Capital
Mainenance; Final Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 54 Fed. Reg. 1150001 (Mar. 21 1989).
43 Among other things, there was a limit to how much Tier 2 could be used in total
capital. See Differences in Capital and Accounting Standards Among the Federal
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system for assets. Assets received a risk-weight of 0, 0.2, 0.5, and 1,
with the safest assets (like U.S. treasuries) receiving the lowest
number, and riskiest assets (like ordinary loans) receiving the
highest number. When calculating the denominator of the capitalasset ratio, the regulator would add together each asset multiplied by
its risk weight. For example, a bank with $100 in U.S. treasuries and
$100 in regular loans would have risk-weighted assets of $100. A
bank with no treasuries and $200 in regular loans would have riskweighted assets of $200. The higher denominators for the second
bank with riskier assets would result in a lower capital ratio. The new
minimums are in Table 3.
Table 3: 1989 Capital Adequacy Regulations
Ratio
Tier 1
Tier 1 + Tier 2
Tier 1 leverage
ratio
(unweighted)

1990
3.25%
7.25%
3%

1992
4%
8%
3%

The 1989 regulations phased in progressively stricter rules over
several years, as shown in Table 3. They also introduced a separate
minimum leverage ratio. The leverage ratio is the ratio of tier 1 equity
to the sum of unweighted assets. 44 It thus served as an additional
cushion that ensured that a bank that tried to game the riskweighting system by accumulating low-weighted assets that were in
fact relatively risky would nonetheless have sufficient capital.
Basel I was regarded as excessively crude from the start.45
Among other problems, the four-basket risk-weighting system bore
little relationship to reality. Consider a bank that has loaned
$100,000 to a family to buy a home and has bought $100,000 in
municipal bonds. The mortgage will typically receive a risk-weighting
of 50% while the municipal bond investment will receive a riskweighting of 20%. But it is highly unlikely that the mortgage is
precisely 2.5 times riskier than the bond investment. The mortgage
may well be exceptionally safe because the homeowner is wealthy
Banking and Thrift Agencies; Report to Congressional Committees, 55 Fed. Reg.
34339-02 (Aug. 22 1990).
44 See supra note __.
45 See Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 576, supra note __.
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and the value of the house is much greater than the loan. The bond
investment may be risky because the city’s finances are in disarray.
To address this problem, central bankers met in Basel again, and
reached a new agreement—known as Basel II—in 2004. 46
Basel II contained numerous innovations, most of which were
never implemented by national regulators. Its most important legacy
was the introduction of exemptions for large sophisticated banks
from the Basel I system, which were permitted to use computer
models to estimate their exposure to various types of risks.
Regulators had actually permitted banks to use these models since
the 1990s, but Basel II formalized this approach. Banks had
developed computer models that they used for internal riskmanagement. These models used data from a bank’s lending
business, plus economic data, to generate predictions about the
bank’s financial position in response to various shocks—such as
interest rate spikes, sovereign debt defaults, housing price declines,
and so on. In 2007, U.S. regulators implemented this new regime. 47
These rules were implemented just in time for the 2007-2008
financial crisis, which revealed that banks were undercapitalized.
Central bankers repaired to Basel to negotiate a new agreement
(Basel III), 48 and Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act. 49 After the
dust settled, the regulators issued the rules in Table 4, which are
based on Basel III. 50
Table 4: 2013 Capital Adequacy Regulations
Tier 1
Tier 1 + Tier 2

6%
8%

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (June 2004),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf (last visited Aug 24, 2014).
47 See 72 FR 69288-01, 69294. The Tier 1 leverage ratio was later increased to 4
percent in 2006.
48 Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking
Systems – Revised Version (June 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
(last visited Aug. 24, 2014).
49 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). For a critical view, see Viral V Archaya & Matthew
Richardson, Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, 4 Ann. Rev. Fin. Econ. 1, 31-33
(2012).
50 Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018-01 (Oct. 11, 2013) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 3, 5, 6, 165, 167, 208, 217, and 225).
46
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4%
4.5%

In addition to raising Tier 1, the 2013 regulations introduced the
common equity Tier 1 category, which includes only common equity
(hence excluding certain types of preferred equity in Tier 1). The
2013 capital rules also introduced a range of additional safeguards,
including a capital conservation buffer requirement that prohibits
banks from issuing dividends when doing so brings them too close to
the capital floors. The buffer requirement effectively raises the
capital requirement another 2.5 percentage points. 51
And so we conclude our whirlwind tour of the history of
capital adequacy regulation. Some caveats bear emphasis. I have
suppressed a large amount of detail and some variation among the
regulators. Some of the rules in the tables above do not apply to
certain types of banks or bank-related institutions; in particular,
globally systemically important financial institutions are governed by
additional rules. 52 Regulators phased in the rules over different
periods of time. 53 They engaged in greater and lesser forms of
regulatory forbearance toward banks that dipped close to the floors
or even fell below them. Indeed, enforcement is a source of a great
deal of variation, as regulators have the discretion to demand that
banks exceed capital requirements, and frequently do. 54 They
amended their rules at various times in ways that I have skipped
over. They no doubt used their judgment in different ways in
evaluating assets. But the overall picture should by now be roughly
clear.

Id. at 62033.
See Financial Stability Board, Update of Group of Global Systemically Important
Banks
3
(2012),
available
at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121031ac.pdf.
53 For the phase-in rules for the 2013 regulations, see Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, New Capital Rule Quick Reference Guide for Community Banks
(2013).
54 For a valuable empirical study of enforcement practices, see Julie Anderson Hill,
Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 Ind. L.J. 645,
708 (2012) (finding great variation in capital-asset ratios demanded by regulators
in enforcement actions).
51
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III. HOW DID REGULATORS CHOOSE (AND JUSTIFY)
THE CAPITAL ADEQUACY RULES?
A. The Regulators’ Explanations
We focus now on the justifications the regulators provided for
the capital adequacy rules and their revisions of those rules. At the
start, they provided hardly any justification at all. The FDIC and the
Fed (acting also on behalf of the OCC) issued terse 3-page statements
announcing the 1981 regulations consisting of boilerplate about the
importance of objective and consistent standards for ensuring the
financial health of banks, and emphasizing that capital adequacy
would remain only one of a number of factors that regulators
evaluate. 55 These statements did not explain why capital adequacy
rules were an appropriate approach to bank regulation, nor why the
regulators chose the minimum capital levels that they did.
The OCC, as a non-independent regulatory agency, was
subject to Executive Order 12,291, which required regulatory
agencies in the executive branch to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of
all proposed “major regulations,” those that are expected to have an
economic impact of at least $100 million annually. 56 The order did
not extend to independent agencies like the Fed and FDIC. The OCC
addressed Executive Order 12,291 in a separate document, in which
it argued that a cost-benefit analysis was not necessary because the
rule would not have an impact of $100 million per year or more. 57
The reason was that the effect of the regulation—to increase the book
value of aggregate capital of national banks by less than five
percent—represented “only a reclassification of already existing
categories of funds.” 58 It is not at all clear what this means.
The OCC also said that because the capital-asset ratios of
national banks would increase as a result of the rule, they will be able
to “compete more aggressively for funds” and make larger loans to a
single borrower. 59 Again, it is not clear what the OCC meant. It might
have meant that banks with larger capital-asset ratios would be able
46 Fed. Reg. 62693-02, supra note ___ (FDIC); 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 33, supra note
___ (Fed and OCC).
56 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
57 Interpretive Rulings; National Banks; Definition of Capital, 48 Fed. Reg. 5635901 (Dec. 21 1983).
58 Id. at 56363.
59 Id.
55
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to borrow at a lower rate of interest and obtain economies of scale in
lending, but if this were true, then banks would voluntarily improve
their capital-asset ratios. The OCC did not acknowledge that the rule
might impose costs on banks.
In a later document the Fed explained that the 1981 rules were
driven by “[c]oncern about the decline in the ratio of capital to bank
assets before 1981.” 60 In the 1970s, the banking system experienced
stress as a result of high inflation and low economic growth. 61 A
number of banks failed and the capital/asset ratio of the industry
declined. 62 Regulators decided that by incorporating capital
standards in a rule, they would encourage banks to strengthen their
balance sheets. But the later document also did not explain the basis
of the minimum capital levels that they chose. The bare fact that
capital levels declined is not by itself cause for alarm: perhaps, they
were already too high relative to the social optimum. Indeed, bank
capital levels were significantly higher in the nineteenth century than
today; 63 it may well be the case that they can be allowed to decline as
banks develop more sophisticated methods for minimizing risk or
diversifying their portfolios.
In 1985, the regulators revised the capital rules in response to
the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, which ordered
regulators to “cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain
adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital for such
banking institutions and by such other methods as the appropriate
Federal banking agency deem appropriate.” 64 The statute was passed
after the Latin American debt crisis, which revealed that some U.S.
banks were heavily exposed to risky foreign debt. Congress
accordingly endorsed the move toward capital adequacy rules and
also encouraged regulators to strengthen them.

Membership of State Banking Institutions; Bank Holding Companies and
Change in Bank Control; Capital Maintenance; Rules of Procedure, 50 Fed. Reg.
16057-01, 16057 (Apr. 24, 1985).
61 Allan H. Meltzer, Origins of the Great Inflation, 87 Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis
Rev. 145 (2005).
62 See Susan Burhouse et al., Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation:
Moving
Forward,
Looking
Back,
FDIC
FYI
(Jan.
14,
2003),
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/011403fyi.html (last visited July
30, 2014).
63 See Admati et al., supra note __.
64 ILSA, supra note ___, 12 U.S.C. § 3907.
60
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Congress did not tell the regulators what the new capital
requirements should be, leaving the regulators the discretion to pick
specific numbers. The regulators did not explain why they chose 5.5%
for primary capital and 6% for total capital. The regulators did note
that the new levels would not affect most banks. As the Fed
explained,
Based on the most recent available data, only 17 state member banks and 61
bank holding companies with assets over $150 million have primary capital
ratios (without deducting intangible assets) below the 5.5 percent minimum
primary capital guideline. Thus, fewer than 2 percent of all state member
banks and 8 percent of all holding companies with assets over $150 million
had primary capital ratios below the minimum benchmark. With respect to
total capital, 25 state member banks and 80 bank holding companies have
total capital ratios (without deducting intangibles) below the 6.0 percent
minimum guideline. 65

Similarly, the FDIC observed that “almost 96% of the banks in the
nation [will not be] impacted by this regulation.” 66 The OCC also
emphasized that few of the national banks that it regulated would be
affected by the new rules. 67
This time, the OCC conducted a cost-benefit analysis under
Executive Order 12,291. 68 The OCC stated that 72 national banks had
a shortfall of at least $1.8 billion in primary capital; 66 of those
banks, plus another 54, had a shortfall of at least $1.3 billion in
secondary capital; and that 389 banks met the minimums but faced
risks that required them to raise their capital ratios. These banks
would thus incur underwriting costs of up to $185 million, and in the
meantime might need to reduce dividend payments.
This accounting of the costs is seriously deficient. The
underwriting costs are obviously trivial—this is just the cost of paying
an investment bank to underwrite a stock offering. The reduction in
dividends—that is, the lost profits—would be the major impact of the
regulation, but the OCC did not estimate it. Thus, it failed to
recognize most of the costs of regulation.

50 Fed. Reg. 16057, supra note ___ at 16059.
Capital Maintenance, 50 Fed. Reg. 11128-01, 11130 (Mar. 19 1985).
67 Minimum Capital Ratios; Issuance of Directives, 50 Fed. Reg. 10207-01, 10208
(Mar. 14 1985).
68 Id. at 10215.
65

66
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The OCC argued that the benefits of the regulation would be
greater solvency for the banks; increased stability of the financial
system; and increased “capacity to fund economic growth.” 69 The
OCC did not estimate these benefits. 70 Thus, although the OCC for
the first time made an effort to identify in a qualitative sense the
costs and benefits of a minimum capital adequacy regulation, it did
not estimate (quantitatively) any of the benefits or the relevant costs.
In 1989, the regulators introduced risk-based capital rules in
the wake of Basel I. The purpose of these standards was to provide a
more accurate assessment of bank health by rewarding banks with
low-risk assets. The regulations also attempted to take account of offbalance sheet liabilities. 71 The regulators did not mention any
concern about existing capital levels; the goal was to provide a more
appropriate measure of financial solvency rather than to strengthen
standards. The OCC did not conduct a cost-benefit analysis because
it did not believe that the rule was a “major rule,” that is, a rule
creating costs of $100 million per year or more. 72 It did not explain
why, but the most likely reason is that it believed that the rule
created net benefits for banks by releasing them from excessively
rigid capital adequacy regulations. The Fed and FDIC noted that
while the regulation would impose some new reporting
requirements, it would not require banks to raise capital. 73
Similarly, in 2007 the regulators adjusted the risk-based rules
by allowing a subset of banks to use internal valuation methods to
determine the appropriate capital-asset ratio in light of the credit risk
of their loans, but did not intend to strengthen them. 74 In a joint
statement the regulators discussed the costs and benefits of the new
rule. The regulators estimated a total cost of $489.9 million for
implementing the new rules—including expenses by regulators as
well as by banks. 75 This amount of money is pocket change for the
banking industry, and does not reflect the major impact of capital

Id.
Id.
71 54 Fed. Reg. 4186.
72 54 Fed. Reg. at 4177.
73 54 Fed. Reg. at 11509 (FDIC); 54 Fed. Reg. at 4197 (Fed).
74 72 Fed. Reg. at 69295.
75 Id. at 69393.
69
70
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regulation, which, by putting a limit on lending, reduces profits. 76 It
may have been the case that the regulators did not expect the 2007
regulations to reduce profits but instead would increase profits by
liberating banks from the arbitrary rules then in effect. 77 If so,
however, the regulators did not quantify this benefit. The regulators
listed other benefits without quantifying them, including better
capital allocation, reduction of regulatory arbitrage, better
coordination across countries, and so on. 78
Finally, with the party over in 2013, the regulators raised
capital adequacy requirements. As the Fed/OCC joint statement
observed, “the recent financial crisis demonstrated that the amount
of high-quality capital held by banking organizations was insufficient
to absorb the losses generated over that period.” 79 The regulators do
not appear to have released a formal cost-benefit analysis, but their
joint statement refers to, and appears to rely on, a pair of cost-benefit
analyses that were conducted by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS), 80 which I will discuss momentarily. But two
passages in the joint statement are of interest.
First, as before, the regulators observe that the new
regulations will not affect most banks.
The agencies’ analysis also indicates that the overwhelming majority of
banking organizations already have sufficient capital to comply with the final
rule. In particular, the agencies estimate that over 95 percent of all insured
depository institutions would be in compliance with the minimums and buffers
established under the final rule if it were fully effective immediately. 81

See Shekhar Aiyar et al., Does Macro-Pru Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy
Experiment 16-20 (NBER Working Paper No. 17822, 2012) (finding regulated
banks decrease lending in response to increased capital requirements).
77 One important aspect of this argument is that banks face competition from the
shadow banking system. See Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Do Strict Capital
Requirements Raise the Cost of Capital? Banking Regulation and the Low Risk
Anomaly 31 (NBER Working Paper No. 19018, 2013) (arguing that capital
requirements do raise capital costs, which disadvantages regulated banks to the
benefit of the shadow banking system).
78 72 Fed. Reg. at 69391.
79 Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 62018-01, 62021 (Oct. 11 2013).
80 An Assessment of the Long-term Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and
Liquidity Requirements, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf (last visited July
30, 2014); Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger
Capital and Liquidity Requirements, http://www.bis.org/publ/othp12.pdf (last
visited July 30, 2014).
81 78 Fed Reg. 62018-01 at 62026.
76
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The FDIC makes a similar statement. 82 These statements are
astonishing in light of the severity of the financial crisis and its effect
on the economy. If banks were undercapitalized prior to 2007-2008,
and their undercapitalization either caused or exacerbated the
financial crisis, as is widely believed, 83 then how could it be the case
that corrective regulations would affect hardly any banks? 84
Second, the regulators note that one of the major costs of the
regulation is that when banks switch from debt to equity, they will
lose tax benefits. 85 However, the loss of tax benefits is not a social
cost that would be included in a cost-benefit analysis—the higher tax
bills for the bank are just a transfer to the public. Thus, these tax
costs are irrelevant.
The BCBS produced a lengthy and sophisticated cost-benefit
analysis that relied heavily on the academic literature. 86 The major
benefit of capital adequacy regulations is that they reduce the
probability of a financial crisis. To calculate the probability of a
financial crisis, the BCBS looked at historical data. A financial crisis
occurs in a country once every 20 to 25 years, or with an average
annual probability of 4.5%. When a banking crisis occurs, the
economy typically goes into recession; thus, the major effect of a
banking crisis is lost economic output. A comparison of studies
indicate that the median loss is 63% of GDP. Using these figures, the
BCBS calculated the expected social benefit from reducing the
probability of a financial crisis by one percent as approximately 0.2%
of GDP per year. The BCBS also estimated the effect of a change in
capital requirements on the probability of the crisis. The probability
Regulatory Capital Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 55340-01, 55467 (Sept. 10 2013)
Admati & Hellwig, supra note __, at 184-85; FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry
Report,
available
at
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf 230 (July 30, 2014).
84 A related puzzle is why banks held excess of the required minimums. See
Franklin Allen et al., Credit Market Competition and Capital Regulation, 24 Rev.
Fin. Stud. 983, 1006 (2011) (arguing that bank competition leads banks to increase
capital above required minimums). It is important to note, as Allen et al. do, that
holding capital above the minimum requirements does that necessarily mean that
banks are adequately capitalized.
85 78 Fed. Reg. 62018-01 at 62153.
86 It is divided in two documents; see An Assessment Of The Long-Term Economic
Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements, supra note __; and
Assessing the Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition To Stronger Capital and
Liquidity Requirements, supra note __.
82
83
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and severity of a financial crisis decline at a decreasing rate as bank
capitalization increases.
The major cost of capital adequacy regulations is the
constraint on banks’ flexibility in choosing financing arrangements
that maximize profit. If banks must maintain a capital-asset ratio,
then they cannot take on too much debt, and must issue equity
instead. 87 The BCBS assumes that the cost is passed on to customers,
who must pay higher interest rates for loans or borrow less money. 88
Thus, the question is the economic impact of an increase in lending
costs. With this information, the net benefits of different capital
ratios can be estimated. Using varying assumptions, the BCBS
estimates optimal capital ratios in the range of 10-15% using a
specific definition of capital that is not used by U.S. regulators. 89
Translated into U.S. legal definitions, a mid-range 12% ratio under
BCBS definitions implies a Tier 1/total assets ratio of 7.6%; a Tier
1/risk-weighted assets ratio of 13.2%, and a total capital/riskweighted assets ratio of 15.6%.90
The BCBS report expresses a great deal of caution in its
recommendations. Historical data on financial crises are sparse, and
because economic conditions are always changing, and different legal
and economic systems prevail in different countries, there are limits
to what one can extrapolate from that data. 91 Moreover, the BCBS
could not quantify numerous costs and benefits, for example, the
possibility that higher capital requirements reduce economic
volatility. Academics have criticized the BCBS for making more
precise estimates of costs than were justified by existing studies, 92
and for assuming that the historical cost of raising equity under weak
capital requirements provides an accurate basis for estimating the
future cost if all banks are required to raise additional capital. 93
Nonetheless, the BCBS study is significantly more illuminating and
87 Similarly, capital requirements reduce a bank’s ability to raise liquidity. See
Skander J. Van den Heuvel, The Welfare Cost of Bank Requirements, 55 J.
Monetary Econ. 316 (2008).
88 The BCBS also includes in the cost-benefit analysis the effect of increased
liquidity requirements in Basel III.
89 See BCBS Assessment of the Long-term Economic Impact, supra note ____, at
29, table 8.
90 See id., at 57, Table A5.1.
91 For a discussion and critique, see Coates, supra note __.
92 Coates, supra note __ at 69.
93 Admati et al., at __.
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useful than the published explanations that U.S. regulators
produced.
The BCBS ratios are considerably higher than the final Basel
III rules, 94 which are being phased in by U.S. regulators. Recall that
the Tier 1 ratio was only 6% (rather than the BCBS’ 13.2%), and the
total ratio was only 8% (rather than the BCBS’ 15.6%). Part of the
explanation for the difference is that US regulators chose to
incorporate part of the capital ratio in the form of capital buffer
requirements, which effectively raise all the rules by 2.5 percentage
points. 95 An additional surcharge of up to 2.5 percentage points for
globally systemic important institutions further increases the ratios
for those institutions. 96 Other differences may be due to different
definitions; however, I have not found a clear explanation. 97
B. Lessons
Regulators raised capital requirements slowly and reluctantly
from 1981 to 2013, while at the same time increasing their
complexity. The increase in complexity was clearly a response to the
problem of regulatory arbitrage. Crude bright-line rules are easy to
administer but invite evasion, resulting in banks that are excessively
risky relative to the goals of those rules. 98 The real puzzle is why the
regulators did not increase capital regulations more aggressively. 99

It is not clear why the final Basel III rules are less demanding than the ratios
recommended by BCBS’s cost-benefit analysis. See Ranjit Lall, From Failure to
Failure: The Politics of International Banking Regulation, 19 Rev. Int’l Pol. Econ.
632, 633 (2011).
95 78 Fed. Reg. at 62033, supra note __.
96
See Financial Stability Board, supra note __, available at
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121031ac.pdf.
97 As discussed by Paul Tucker, the cumulative effect of these requirements, taking
into account the various loopholes in Basel I, was to increase capital requirements
for systemically important institutions by as much as ten times. See Paul Tucker,
Capital Regulation in the New World: The Political Economy of Regime Change
(unpub. m.s., 2014).
98 On complexity, rules, and standards for financial regulation, see Prasad
Krishnamurthy, Rules, Standards, and Complexity in Capital Regulation, J. Legal
Stud. (forthcoming). See also Ran Duchin & Denis Sosyura, Safer Ratios, Riskier
Portfolios: Banks’ Response to Government Aid, 113 J. Fin. Econ. 12 (2014)
(finding that banks receiving government support tended to shift toward riskier
assets within the same asset class).
99 One response by the regulators might be that while ratios have not increased
drastically, the definitions of Tier 1 and equity capital have become more strict. See
94
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To see why this is a puzzle, recall that as a matter of theory,
capital regulations should constrain the behavior of banks because,
in the absence of regulation, banks maximize profits by making loans
and investments that are riskier than what is socially optimal. 100
These incentives are possessed by all banks, including the bestmanaged, not only by poorly managed or marginal banks. Moreover,
the magnitude of this effect is significant. The BCBS cost-benefit
analysis suggests that optimal capital ratios are significantly higher
than those implemented by regulators. Academics have conducted
their own cost-benefit analyses, and an emerging consensus indicates
that optimal capital rules may be even stricter than those
recommended by the BCBS. 101
Yet U.S. regulators took pains, even as late as 2013, to argue
that their regulations would affect very few banks, only the bottom
5% or so. Historical data bear out this claim. Figure 2, which shows
the average ratio of capital to assets of U.S. banks since 1950,
provides no evidence that new capital regulations changed banks’
portfolios. Empirical studies confirm that U.S. capital adequacy rules
have not affected the capital-asset ratios of banks. 102 The ratios in
those rules were too low, or the rules were too easy to arbitrage.
Many banks did increase their capital-asset ratios at various times,
for example in the 1990s, but this was in response to market forces,
not to capital adequacy rules. 103 The capital adequacy rules were like
200 mph speed limits that no one exceeds because their cars cannot
drive so fast.

Martin Feldstein, What Powers for the Federal Reserve?, 48 J. Econ. Lit 142
(2010).
100 See Part I, supra.
101 See sources cited in supra note __; Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital,
Harv. Bus. Rev. (forthcoming 2014).
102 See, e.g., Mark J. Flannery & Kasturi P. Rangan, What Caused the Bank Capital
Build-up of the 1990s?, 12 Rev. Finance 391, 423 (2008) (finding no statistically
significant relationship between capital rules and capital-asset ratios of bank
holding companies in the 1980s and 1990s); Reint Gropp & Florian Heider, The
Determinants of Bank Capital Structure, 14 Rev. Finance 1 (2010) (capital
regulation did not affect capital-asset ratios in the 1990s and early 2000s). These
articles cite an extensive literature on this topic. See also Tarullo, supra note __, at
141-42. There is also an extensive literature on why market forces cause banks to
hold capital beyond regulatory limits; for an example, see, e.g., Allen, et al., supra
note __.
103 See Allen, Elena Carletti, et al., supra note __.
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Figure 2: Bank Capital-Asset Ratios
and Legal Requirements 104
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As noted above, the introduction of risk-weighting was
apparently motivated by worries that unweighted capital-asset rules
were excessively crude and invited arbitrage. But risk-weighting was
itself a crude response to this problem. As Prasad Krishnamurthy
shows, it would have been possible for regulators to conduct a costbenefit analysis of risk-weighting. 105 If they had, they might well have
decided to forgo it because of the equivocal evidence that it could
enhance the financial health of banks. Yet they did not engage in
rigorous cost-benefit analysis, and effectively weakened capital
requirements by enabling banks to classify high-risk assets as lowrisk. 106
Capital and asset data are from http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/. The figure should
be taken with many grains of salt. It shows only equity capital over total
unweighted assets, aggregates different types of commercial banks. Finally, as
noted in text, while minimum capital rules did not exist prior to 1981, regulators
did take account of capital-asset ratios when evaluating the financial health of
banks. The empirical studies cited in note __ provide a more rigorous analysis.
105 Krishnamurthy, supra note ___.
106 Admati & Hellwig, supra note __, at __.
104
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All of this suggests that if regulators had used cost-benefit
analysis, they would have produced stricter capital-adequacy rules,
which would have caused banks to raise capital-asset ratios. Because
inadequate capitalization contributed to the 2007-2008 financial
crisis, 107 the failure to use cost-benefit analysis probably increased
the severity of that crisis. 108 Hence, contrary to the usual charge that
cost-benefit analysis blocks regulation, 109 in the area of finance costbenefit analysis would have advanced regulation. 110
Why didn’t regulators use cost-benefit analysis? What were
they doing instead? We turn to these questions in Part IV.
IV. NORMING AS A REGULATORY STRATEGY IN BANKING LAW
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis, Feasibility Analysis, and Norming
What is the explanation for the financial regulators’ choices of
minimum capital levels? 111 The regulators obviously believed that a
relatively high capital-asset ratio is an important mark of the
financial health of banks. This belief is at least plausible; most
economists agree. 112 But that is only the beginning of the inquiry. The
question is how to determine the right levels for capital adequacy
requirements.
One hypothesis is that the regulators chose the socially
optimal capital-asset requirements in light of the information
available at the time, based on formal cost-benefit analyses or at least
informal cost-benefit reasoning. As we have seen, the OCC produced
Admati & Hellwig, supra note __, at 184-85; FCIC, supra note __, at 230.
Another contributing factor could be that bank regulation, split among three
main agencies in the United States, is too fragmented. See Kenneth R. French et
al.,
The
Squam
Lake
Report:
Fixing
the
Financial
System,
(last
visited
http://www.stat.unc.edu/faculty/cji/890-11/SquamLake.pdf
9/3/2014).
109 See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note __, at 1383-4; Thomas
McGarrity, supra note __.
110 An alternative hypothesis is simply that regulators believed that other
prudential tools at their disposal were sufficient to deter bank runs and they
deliberately chose low minimum capital rules because they did not believe they
were necessary.
111 I will address risk-weighting and related issues in Section D.
112 See Admati & Hellwig, supra note __.
107

108
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some cost-benefit analyses; the other regulators discussed costs and
benefits; and the BCBS produced a cost-benefit analysis for the
capital adequacy rules in Basel III. But it is doubtful that these costbenefit analyses determined the capital-asset rules that were
ultimately issued. The cost-benefit analyses produced by the
regulators were informal, addressed the wrong costs and did not
quantify the benefits, and in any event did not appear to be done in a
rigorous fashion and so could not justify a specific ratio. The first
high-quality cost-benefit analysis was the BCBS’s, which, however,
was not explicitly adopted by U.S. regulators. It is possible that
behind the scenes U.S. regulators engaged in formal or informal costbenefit analysis but that seems highly unlikely given the woefully
inadequate levels that the regulators chose before (and probably even
in) 2013.
To understand the regulators’ behavior, we start with an
observation that the regulations could be predicted directionally
from data about bank weakness. The stricter rules in 1981, 1985, and
2013 followed periods of financial instability. The rules of 1989 and
2007, which either relaxed or maintained standards, followed
periods of financial health. The regulators acted like a person in a
shower who turns the faucet toward hot if the water is too cold and
turns the faucet toward cold if the water is too hot.
Still, we need to ask why the regulator raised or lowered
capital levels as much (or as little) as they did. A major clue is the
repeated insistence by the regulators that the new rules affected
hardly any banks. 113 Changes would be made, but they would be
small enough not to cause much harm to the industry. The only
banks hurt by the regulations would be a handful of barely solvent
banks, which would be forced to raise capital or shut down. 114
This approach resembles feasibility analysis, another standard
used by regulators to evaluate regulations. Under feasibility analysis,
the regulator chooses the strictest level of regulation that is
“feasible,” in the sense of not imposing excessive costs on the
See Part III.A., supra.
Another way of framing this criticism is that regulators adopt capital
requirements in a microprudential way – in other words, that they aim to
individual bank failures rather than systemic costs. See Samuel G. Hanson et al., A
Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J. Econ. Perspectives 4-5
(2011).
113
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industry in terms of job loss, bankruptcy, and factory shutdowns. 115
Feasibility analyses are often used in environmental regulation,
where the regulator imposes the strictest possible pollution controls
that do not cause excessive harm to industry. In a typical feasibility
analysis, the regulator describes these effects of a regulation, and
then justifies the regulation by arguing that these harmful effects are
small. 116
Feasibility analysis is not a rigorous style of evaluation.
“Feasibility” is not defined; it is impossible to determine why one or
two factory shutdowns are tolerable while four or five are not. Many
commentators think that feasibility analysis favors regulatory
aggressiveness. 117 In environmental regulation, rules justified as
feasible are often criticized on cost-benefit grounds. 118
In banking regulation, by contrast, the style of regulation is
significantly less aggressive than what cost-benefit analysis implies.
For this reason, feasibility analysis seems not to be an apt description
of the regulatory decision-procedure. Instead, regulators seem driven
by a desire to inflict as little cost on the industry as possible—to mop
up outliers, the riskiest banks, while leaving most banks
unaffected. 119 Moreover, regulations based on feasibility analysis
typically impose costs on all firms in the industry even if it bankrupts
only a few. By contrast, banking regulation imposes no costs (aside
from reporting requirements) on all but the weakest firms in the
industry. The banks at the middle or higher on the normal
distribution are unaffected; for that reason, I call this form of
regulation “norming.”
B. Is Norming a Justifiable Style of Financial Regulation?
Is it possible that norming is the proper way to regulate the
banking industry? There are strong reasons for doubt. As explained
115 See David Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to
Masur and Posner, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev 313 (2011) (describing feasibility
analysis).
116 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 657 (2010).
117 See Driesen, supra note __ (providing a qualified defense of feasibility analysis).
118 Masur & Posner, supra note ___.
119 For an explanation and critique of bank regulators’ behavior, see Jeremy Bulow
& Paul Klemperer, Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation 11-12 (unpub. m.s.
2013), http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/klemperer/MBBCR.pdf (last visited
9/3/2014).
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earlier, the government’s role in providing emergency liquidity gives
all banks an incentive to maintain an excessively risky portfolio. 120
The proper regulatory response should be to reduce this perverse
incentive.
One could nonetheless imagine a justification for norming as a
cautious, pragmatic form of regulation that may seem reasonable in
the face of great uncertainty. 121 Suppose that financial regulators
know that banks have an excessive incentive to take risk, but they do
not know the magnitude of that incentive or the risk. One possibility
is that the risk is very small: perhaps the risk of a financial crisis is
small and, should a financial crisis occur, the economy can recover
quickly. Another possibility is that the risk is very large. If the
regulator does not know the magnitude of the risk, it has no basis for
choosing a specific degree of regulatory strictness. In addition, the
regulator may fear unintended consequences. For example, if it
raises capital requirements by a large amount, banks will pay less for
deposits, and this will cause depositors to take their funds to money
market mutual funds or elsewhere, precipitating a crisis or creating
general economic dislocations that are hard to predict. 122
The regulators may therefore adopt a cautious ratcheting
strategy. They raise capital regulations a small amount, and then see
what happens. If capital flees from banks, they learn that the
unintended consequences are more severe than they anticipated, and
can retreat. If it does not, they learn that perhaps those consequences
may be safely ignored, and can then make plans to further increase
the strictness of the regulation. Meanwhile, the regulation will also
have some direct beneficial effect as it will force the weakest banks to
shut down or raise capital. This approach has an experimental feel.
In a climate of extreme uncertainty, it may be justified to engage in
small steps and see what the market reaction is. This will create
120 This has been framed as a time-inconsistency problem: because the government
faces enormous political costs resulting from bank failures, even the toughest
capital requirements may be relaxed when a bank is at risk of failure. See Oliver
Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions,
13 Amer. L. Econ. Rev. 482 (2011).
121 On this topic, see Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in
Administrative Law) (unpub. m.s. 2013); Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of
Quantification, Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
122 There is cause for regulators to worry about high capital requirements funneling
investment to the shadow banking system. See Milton Harris et al., Higher Capital
Requirements, Safer Banks? Macroprudential Regulation in a Competitive
Financial System 32-33 (unpub. m.s. 2014).
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additional information that will reduce some of the uncertainty, and
provide the basis for additional regulation if necessary. 123 The smallstep approach also helps address the often exaggerated but politically
effective claims of regulated parties that even a little bit of regulation
will destroy thousands of jobs or the economy itself. 124
A further consideration is that banking regulators are
responsible for the health of the banking system, while
environmental regulators are not responsible for the financial health
of the industries that they regulate. When a banking regulator raises
capital requirements, it takes a risk that it will force banks to shut
down, and then it will be responsible for ensuring that those bank
shut-downs do not cause panic and contagion. When an
environmental regulation drives a firm into bankruptcy, the EPA has
no specific obligations toward that firm, its shareholders, and its
creditors. Thus, banking regulators may have stronger incentives to
issue regulations that leave most firms unaffected.
Norming may well be justified in a range of regulatory areas,
but it seems inappropriate for banking regulation. Because of the
rarity and severity of financial crises, little will be learned from
raising standards incrementally and then waiting to see what
happens. If no financial crisis takes place, nothing will be learned. If
a financial crisis does take place, then significant harm will have
occurred. Moreover, data on financial institutions is plentiful, and
thus makes possible reasonable predictions about the effect of
regulations on the financial system. 125
C. A Political Theory of Norming
The political economy of banking regulation has received a
great deal of attention. In a recent book, Charles Calomiris and
Stephen Haber argue that the U.S. banking system is, and has been,
fragile because of the role of interest groups in constructing the state
and federal legal system. 126 In the nineteenth century and much of
the twentieth century, small state banks formed a political alliance
with populist interests that feared that large financial institutions
See Matthew Spitzer & Eric Talley, On Experimentation and Real Options in
Financial Regulation, 42 J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming).
124 See, e.g., Editorial, They Keep Fighting Back, NY Times, Feb. 2, 2012, at A24
(discussing banks’ resistance to capital regulations).
125 See Posner & Weyl, Response, supra note __.
126 Calomiris & Haber, Fragile by Design, supra note __ .
123
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would use their economic power to harm southern and western
farmers. This alliance resisted sporadic efforts to permit banks to
merge and grow, enabling small banks to maintain monopoly power
in their markets. 127 After urbanization and technological
development weakened the ability of small banks to earn monopoly
rents in the 1980s and 1990s, consolidation took place, resulting in
the much-feared political domination of large banks and financial
conglomerates, which formed alliances with urban activists who
sought cheaper credit for low-income people. The result was
deregulation, the erosion of underwriting standards, and ultimately
the financial crisis of 2007-2008. 128
Many other scholars agree that the banking industry played a
significant role in pushing for deregulation, which took place both at
the legislative level and at the level of regulation. 129 Congress passed
numerous statutes that weakened the rules. These statutes included
the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980,130 which phased out interest rate ceilings on deposits; the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
1994, 131 which abolished many restrictions on interstate banking;
and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 132 which eliminated the
Glass-Steagall wall between commercial and investment banking.
During this entire period, going as far back as the 1960s, the

Id. at 158-83.
Id. at 203-13.
129 For discussions of the political economy of banking regulation, see, e.g.,
Calomiris & Haber, Fragile by Design, supra note __; Randall S. Kroszner & Philep
E. Strahan, Regulation and Deregulation of the US Banking Industry: Causes,
Consequences, and Implications for the Future, in Economic Regulation and Its
Reform: What Have We Learned? 485 (Nancy L. Rose ed. 2014) (emphasizing
interest-group competition between pro-regulation small banks and antiregulation big banks); James Livingston, Origins of the Federal Reserve System:
Money, Class, and Corporate Capitalism, 1890-1913 (1986) (emphasizing populist
distrust of banking); James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio Jr., and Ross Levine,
Guardians of Finance: Making Regulators Work for Us (2012) (arguing that
regulatory breakdown that led to the financial crisis was caused by ideology, the
influence of the financial industry, the psychological biases of regulators, and the
opacity of regulation); Simon Johnson, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and
the Next Financial Meltdown 200 (2011) (similar).
130 Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (Mar. 31, 1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 226).
131 Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (Sept. 29, 1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §
1811).
132 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999) (codified in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.)
127
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individual banking regulators also increasingly allowed banks to
enter new markets, based on broad interpretations of the law. 133
There is little doubt that banks also pressured regulators to
reduce—or not to increase too much—capital requirements. 134 Yet
banking regulators were also under political pressure to increase
capital requirements. As we saw, the decline in capital levels of banks
in the 1970s, accompanied by bank failure, led regulators to increase
capital adequacy requirements in 1981, and Congress to urge them
forward in 1983. 135 The S&L crisis in the 1980s further illustrated the
dangers of undercapitalized banks. 136
Norming as a decision-procedure can be seen as a way of
responding to these contradictory pressures. Imagine that a regulator
wants to avoid criticism for failing to regulate, and criticism for
regulating too strictly. The criticism for regulating too strictly comes
from industry, which directly bears the cost of regulation. The
criticism for failing to regulate may come from public interest groups
and from industries that compete with the regulated industry.
Congress may also criticize a regulator for failing to regulate strictly
when the law calls for strict regulation, but Congress has diverse
constituencies, and the regulated industry as well as the beneficiaries
from regulation will be able to influence it.
These competing pressures could in some cases result in
significant levels of regulation, as is illustrated by environmental
regulation. Industries that pollute fight against environmental
regulations because those regulations increase their costs of
business. But public interest groups like the Sierra Club urge
regulators to regulate strictly. A regulator may try to optimize
See, e.g., NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.,
513 U.S. 251 (1995) (approving OCC’s decision to permit banks to act as agents for
the sale of annuities); Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2986) (approving the Fed’s
decision to permit banks to engage in private placements of commercial paper).
134 Johnson, supra note __, at 200 (discussing the influence of banks on
regulators); Calomiris & Haber, supra note __, at 263-66 (same). For a discussion
of banks’ impact on the Basel process, see Ranjit Lall, From Failure to Failure: The
Politics of International Banking Regulation, 19 Rev. Inter. Pol. Econ. 609, 610
(2012) (arguing that large banks had a significant influence on negotiations, which
led to a weakening of standards).
135 See supra note __.
136 See generally Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, How Well Capitalized Are WellCapitalized Banks?, 1997 New Eng. Econ. Rev. 41.
133
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between these competing pressures. Many environmental regulations
are fairly strict, reflecting perhaps that public interest groups can
mobilize public pressure by bringing to the attention of the public the
harmful effects of pollution on people’s health and well-being.
In the area of financial regulation, public interest groups seem
considerably weaker. It is plausible (though hard to demonstrate)
that the public feels less strongly about financial regulation than
about environmental regulation. 137 The beneficial effects of capital
adequacy regulation are far more obscure than the beneficial effects
of regulations that reduce the amount of arsenic in water supplies.138
Thus, if financial regulation is inadequate, it will be difficult for
public interest groups to mobilize public pressure. 139 Indeed, while
we are all familiar with the major environmental groups like Sierra
Club and Greenpeace, it is hard to think of the names of the groups
that seek greater financial regulation. 140 They have a blurrier public
profile because the public is less interested in financial regulation
than in environmental regulation, and has a weaker understanding of
financial regulation than of environmental regulation.
Consider, for example, the difference between the public
reaction to climate change and the public reaction to the financial
crisis. While not everyone believes that climate change is taking
place, it has remained in the news continuously—whenever the
weather is bad, or a natural disaster occurs, or a new study is
released. By contrast, the financial crisis generated Occupy Wall
Street, which grabbed public attention about a year, and then petered
out, long before banking regulators had completed the hundreds of
new regulations authorized by the Dodd-Frank Act. 141 Economic
recovery seems to quell outrage about financial crises, while concerns
about the quality of the environment persist over booms and busts.

137 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 Ohio
St. L.J. 1277, 1287-88 (1989) (describing and citing literature).
138 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L.J. 2255, 2256 (2002)
(describing EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate arsenic regulations).
139 See Atif Mian et al., Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the
Aftermath of Financial Crises, 6 Amer. Econ. J.: Macroeconomics 25, 26 (2014).
140 Id. at 1288-90.
141 Based on a search in Google Trends; see <script type="text/javascript"
src="//www.google.com/trends/embed.js?hl=enUS&q=occupy+wall+street&cmpt=q&content=1&cid=TIMESERIES_GRAPH_0&e
xport=5&w=500&h=330"></script>.
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There are many other differences between environmental
regulation and financial regulation. One is that pollution is often a
continuous problem. If smog envelops a town, everyone sees (and
smells) it. Financial crises, by contrast, are sporadic. Twenty years
separated the S&L crisis of the 1980s and the financial crisis of 20072008. The financial industry can resist regulation by using a strategy
of delay in the immediate aftermath of the crisis until public
attention has wandered. Polluting industries have no such strategy.
Another is that financial regulation is global while
environmental regulation is usually a national matter. 142 It is much
easier to move money overseas than to move plants and equipment
overseas; accordingly, excessive financial regulation can lead to
capital flight while excessive environmental regulation will have a
more limited effect on the regulated industry. In such circumstances,
a certain amount of regulatory conservatism, as reflected in the
norming approach, is easy to understand, even if it is not necessarily
optimal.
Note also that major financial institutions gain from
regulation to the extent that it reduces competition from marginal
institutions. Thus, the financial industry may well be willing to
support stricter capital-adequacy regulations that eliminate
competition from marginal enterprises that can undercut them on
prices. Indeed, to the extent that weak banks can spark panic and
contagion, major banks benefit from rules that regulate the weak
banks out of existence. It may well be the case that “norming” will be
attractive to an agency that is captured by an industry. The industry
uses the agency to eliminate outliers; the agency’s regulatory efforts
are then seen by an uninformed public, to the extent that it is paying
attention, as evidence that the agency is not excessively passive. A
similar argument has been made about licensing requirements,
which are sometimes seen as device used by an industry that has
captured legislators or regulators to raise the costs of entry beyond
what is justified by legitimate health and safety considerations. 143
There are a few exceptions to this generalization, including the regulation of
chlorofluorocarbon and carbon emissions. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and
Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2007) (describing
treaty negotiations to address two major international environmental problems—
the ozone hole and climate change).
143 See Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 Amer. Econ. Rev. 47, 48 (1982)
(arguing that incumbent firms may support regulations that raise the cost of entry
to potential competitors).
142
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The interest-group pressures that cause banking regulation to
deviate from the social optimum are complicated, and a large
literature already identifies ways that those pressures may influence
specific policies, like chartering requirements, capital levels, and so
on. 144 The argument being advanced here is that those pressures may
also affect a regulator’s choice of decision-procedure or methodology
for evaluating regulations. Norming will appeal to any regulator that
faces strong headwinds from interest groups because it encourages
limited regulation that benefits most firms while harming only
outliers—and that also wants to be seen as doing something so as to
avoid offending Congress and the public.
One of the virtues of cost-benefit analysis is that it provides
intellectual resources for resisting political pressure. If bank
regulators had used cost-benefit analysis to evaluate capital
regulations, they might have been able to resist some of the pressure
brought against them. 145 One might argue that if regulators had been
captured by industry, they would simply have manipulated costbenefit analysis. But a manipulated cost-benefit analysis is a bad
cost-benefit analysis, and evidence of such manipulation could have
been used by forces hostile to deregulation to counter the pressure of
the banks. It is also not clear that bank regulators were really
captured. They may well have been influenced by ideological currents
of the time that favored deregulation. But even deregulators can be
influenced by cost-benefit analysis when the results are
compelling. 146
See Macey, supra note __, at 1278.
They might also not have. It is important to recognize that there was a great deal
of controversy over what the optimal capital regulations would be. Many
economists believed that, for example, Basel II rules were too strict or too rigid.
See, e.g., Anil K. Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein, Cyclical Implications of the Basel-II
Capital Standards 27-67 (unpub. m.s. 2003) (arguing that Basel II should have
provided for lower standards during recessions so as to avoid exacerbating cyclical
downturns); Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Bank Regulation and the Credit Crunch,
19 J. Banking & Fin. 679, 690-91 (1995) (arguing that enforcement of capital
requirements caused credit shrinkage in New England). However, I have not found
contemporary papers that did formal cost-benefit analyses of capital-asset rules as
opposed to pointing out various isolated empirical effects of them.
146 A frequently cited example is the Reagan administration’s decision to support
an ozone treaty after being shown a cost-benefit analysis that showed that the
ozone hole produced huge costs, while regulations that would ameliorate the
problem would impose relatively low costs on industry. See Sunstein, Of Montreal
and Kyoto, supra note __, at 15.
144
145
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CONCLUSION
It is by now well-known that the government underregulated
the financial industry from the 1980s to the financial crisis, and that
the underregulation contributed to that financial crisis. The
deregulation of the financial industry had complex roots. Banks were
overregulated in the post-World War II period, which made it
difficult for them to survive the economic stresses of the 1970s. Many
of the rules—such as restrictions on branching—made very little
sense from the standpoint of the public interest, and it was
reasonable to abolish them. Yet no one believed that banks should be
completely deregulated. Regulators retained their legal authority to
regulate banks for safety and soundness, and several statutes enacted
in the 1980s encouraged them to do so.
Basic economic principles indicated that banks will take
excessive risks unless regulated. Indeed, the S&L crisis of the 1980s
was a textbook illustration of the economic consequences of
insufficient financial regulation, 147 and Congress responded in 1989
by ordering regulators to tighten the rules. 148 Thus, economic
principles and statutory mandates should have equipped regulators
with justifications for relatively strict capital rules. 149 Yet regulators
did not issue strict capital regulations. Instead, they adopted a
strategy of norming, which ensured that the rules did no more than
weed out a handful of outliers.
The explanation for this behavior may be that regulatory zeal
simply crumbled in the face of industry opposition. But another
hypothesis is that regulators lacked an adequate decision procedure
that would have enabled them to see that industry’s demands were
unreasonable. We cannot re-run history and see what would have
happened if regulators had been required to use cost-benefit
analysis. It is possible that regulators would have conducted phony
cost-benefit analyses (as OCC did) and the same outcome would have
occurred. Critics of cost-benefit analysis worry that this decisionSee Edward J. Kane, The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen? (1989)
(describing the regulatory failures that led to the S&L crisis).
148 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811).
149 As did the academic literature, which overwhelmingly criticized bank
regulations for encouraging banks to engage in excessive risk-taking. See, e.g.,
Macey, supra note __, at 1278 & n.8 (1989) (describing and citing literature).
147
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procedure encourages regulators to ignore intangible, hard-to-value
benefits of a regulation. 150 In the area of financial regulation, the
statistical value of an avoided financial crisis may have been regarded
as to hard to value.
But even if this criticism is valid for environmental regulation,
it is hard to imagine that something similar could happen in financial
regulation. In the case of environmental regulation, the
Environmental Protection Agency typically does value the major
hard-to-measure-benefits of regulation—namely, avoided statistical
deaths. It ignores certain other, even harder-to-measure benefits like
the abstract value of the continuing existence of wilderness or mild
harms like headaches. 151 The cost-benefit analyses may therefore
understate benefits but likely not by much. By contrast, if financial
regulators ignore the benefit of reducing the probability of a financial
crisis, there would be virtually no benefit to financial regulation—and
capital requirements would be reduced to zero. No one believes that
this is the right outcome. A cost-benefit analysis requirement would
thus compel regulators to undertake this difficult but not impossible
valuation exercise rather than ignore it. 152
The history of capital regulation also contains larger lessons
for the regulatory state. Norming, and its close cousin, feasibility
analysis, lend themselves to underregulation when the regulator
faces determined opposition from industry. Neither approach
contains the intellectual resources for justifying regulations that
impose large costs on society. Critics of cost-benefit analysis 153 and
defenders of feasibility analysis 154 should be careful what they wish
for.

Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note __, at 200.
For a discussion, see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of
Cost-Benefit Analysis 126-27 (2006) (discussing the problem of measurement).
152 Which is not to say that judicial enforcement of cost-benefit would have been
justified. On the question of institutional enforcement, see Robert P. Bartlett, III,
The Institutional Framework for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A
Tale of Four Paradigms?, J. Legal Stud. (forthcoming).
153 See, e.g., Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note __; McGarrity, supra note __;
Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 Colum.
J. Envtl. L. 191, 240-41 (2004) (arguing that cost-benefit analysis indeterminate).
154 Driesen, supra note __.
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